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and Antonio Urdinola* 
In the first half of the 1980s one of the clearest 
developments in Colombia's financial sector as in 
that of several other Latin American economies, was 
the increasing indebtedness of private and public 
enterprises. A large part of the increased lending was 
of domestic origin and this led to an unprecedented 
growth in the financial assets held by the public and 
the intermediation systems. At the same time the 
formerly buoyant stock market went into its death 
throes; the great majority of shares came into the 
hands of a few large investors, for the small investor 
put his savings into the financial instruments issued 
by the intermediaries who were lending to business. 
This article has three purposes. Firstly, to des-
cribe and analyse the evolution of the debt of the 
business sector in Colombia and of the financial 
sector which supplied it, distinguishing debt in the 
national currency from debt in foreign currencies 
and giving greater attention to the former. Secondly, 
to examine the links between the debt phenomenon 
and the development of economic activity and the 
production performance of business. Lastly, to study 
the effects of the domestic debt on the vulnerability 
of the financial sector. Obviously, high debt coeffi-
cients increase the risk of bankruptcy, and if this 
phenomenon becomes widespread it limits the 
capacity of financial bodies to maintain acceptable 
levels of risk by portfolio diversification, It is clear, as 
the article will show, that this ¡s what happened to 
Colombia's financial intermediaries during the first 
half of the 1980s. 
'The authors are Antonio J. Urdinola, postgraduate 
student of economics at Harvard University and special 
adviser to the Executive Secretary of ECLAC in ECLAC's 
Bogotá Office, and Mauricio Carrizosa who has an M.A. in 
economics from Chicago University and is an economist in 
the World Bank. 
This paper was prepared as part of the UNDP/ECLAC 
Joint Project RLA/77/021 "Implications for Latin America 
of the International Monetary and Financial System". 
I 
Evolution of business 
sector debt 
This description of the evolution of the debt over 
time makes a distinction between non-financial 
and financial enterprises. The reasons for this 
distinction are clear: on the one hand, the debt of 
financial bodies is specifically regulated by legis-
lation in terms of their net worth; on the other 
hand, a large part of business debt is supplied 
indirectly from the resources obtained by the 
banks, so that it is wrong to add together the debt 
of the two types of body. 
1. Debt of non-financial enterprises 
There exist statistics which show the evolution 
of the debt of corporations which are not finan-
cial intermediaries between 1950 and 1984. The 
figures show a trend for capital to be financed 
from borrowing (table 1). At the beginning of 
the 1950s the proportion financed by debt was 
less than a quarter of total liabilities. By the 
mid-1980s almost three-quarters of these liabili-
ties did not pertain to the owners of the 
companies. 
There is of course the familiar bias caused by 
the counting of fixed assets as historical costs; 
but even if this were corrected, it would hardly 
offset the upward trend of the debt, for other 
economic indicators support the descriptive 
hypothesis set out above. One of these indicators 
is the comparison, from 1970 onwards, of the 
interest and dividends paid by enterprises, which 
shows the increasing importance of interest 
(table 2). A second indicator is the significant 
growth in non-stock financial assets in relation 
to the gross domestic product, especially in the 
1950s and from 1970. A third indicator is the 
significant decline in the 1970s in the commer-
cial value of a sample of shares of all the incorpo-
rated companies which were once 
unincorporated expressed as a proportion of a 
total which also includes non-stock financial 
assets.1 It is thus clear that the increasing busi-
'The last two indicators are given respectively in Carrizosa 
( 1985), p. 140, and in Carrizosa ( 1986), pp. 94-96. The indicator of 
interest and dividends is obtained from the income and expendi-
ture accounts of the enterprises in the National Accounts of 
Colombia prepared by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
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ness debt had its counterpart in the rapid devel-
opment of financial instruments intermediated 
by lending institutions and in the stagnation of 
stock issues as a means of mobilizing resources. 
It is now necessary to consider the distribu-
tion of debt between national and foreign cur-
rencies. Unfortunately, this cannot be done 
directly since the financial statements submitted 
to the Office of the Superintendent of Compan-
ies make no distinction between the two types of 
Table 1 









































































Source: 1950-1980: Restrepo (1985), p. 14. 
1981-1983: Office of the Superintendent of 
Companies (1984), Boletín mensual. Nos. 3, 4, 
and 6. 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: INTEREST COSTS A N D 
DIVIDENDS OF NON-FINANCIAL 
PRIVATE COMPANIES A N D 
QUASI-COMPANIES, 1970-1983 






























































Source: National Bureau of Statistics (1985), Cuentas 
Nacionales de Colombia, 1970-1983, table 25, pp. 
128-141. 
debt. But it is possible and useful to compare the 
total external private debt of the non- financial 
sector with the total national-currency portfolio 
of the banking system and of private financial 
corporations. This comparison (table 3) indi-
cates no specific trend in the relative importance 
of the two types of debt.2 The relative propor-
tion of the debt in foreign currencies declined for 
a time between 1975 and 1978. In fact, the exter-
nal private debt expressed in dollars remained 
stationary at around US$1 100 million up to 
1978 and then grew vigorously up to 1982. The 
external debt expressed in dollars then stabilized 
and the increase in its peso value from 1982 was 
due basically to the increase in financial costs 
resulting from the devaluation. 
To sum up, the aggregate figures show, 
firstly, an increase in the global indices of busi-
2However, it is possible that other non-traditional interme-
diaries, for example commercial finance companies, may have 
supplied an increasing amount of funds. But such funds stillconsti-
tute a small fraction of the total market. 
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Table 3 
COLOMBIA: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DEBT, 1970-1984 
















































































































Source; (1) Bank of the Republic. 
(2) and (4) Banking Association of Colombia (1985). 
ness debt and, secondly, no permanent changes 
in the distribution between debt of external and 
internal origin. It seems that the capacity for 
domestic intermediation of funds grew roughly 
in the same way as the access to debt in foreign 
currencies, at least during the 1970s. 
A more detailed description must be given of 
the debt of non-financial companies. A sample 
was taken of corporations with a view to calcu-
lating coefficients of total debt and debt by type 
of creditor, together with indices of liquidity and 
short-term debt, which indicate changes in the 
global debt characteristics (table 4). The average 
shown in the last une confirms the upward trend 
of debt, except in the last year when the trend 
shows a considerable decline. There are some 
extreme cases of debt greater than total assets, 
indicating negative net worth. 
The proportion of short-term liabilities in 
total external liabilities remained constant, on 
average, throughout the period (table 5). Cur-
rent (short-term) liabilities represent a more or 
less constant proportion —about 60%— of the 
total debt. However, as the increase in total debt 
was not accompanied by a similar increase in 
liquid assets, the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities declined significantly. As can be seen 
from table 6, this decline occurred during the 
1960s and 1970s; the average liquidity index of 
corporations was around 1.5- In comparison 
with the 1960s, these companies now run a 
greater risk of being unable to meet their current 
obligations on time. It is therefore no surprise 
that, as will be discussed below, the matured 
portfolio of financial bodies should also have 
increased significantly. 
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Table 4 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF DEBT INDICES IN A SAMPLE 





Cía. Colombiana de Tabaco 
Cía. Molinera de Herrán 
Cía. Nacional de Chocolates 
Industrias Alimenticias Noel 





La Garantfa-A. Dishington 
Paños Vicuña Santa Fé 
Sociedad Industrial Alicachín 
Tejicondor 
Tejidos Única 




Cementos del Valle 
Cementos Diamante 




Ladrillera La Candelaria 
Tubos Moore 
Vidriera de Colombia 





Industrias Metálicas de Palmira 




Urbanización David Puyana 
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Source: Financial statements of the companies. Office of the Superintendent of Companies. Commerce Seaion. 
Not*: The figures for 1960-Î982 were compiled in Figueroa Jaramillo (1983). Those for 1985 were compiled direaly by the authors. 
Total third-party liabilities 
"Debt index = r— x 100 
''The arithmetical average. 
Total assets 
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Table 5 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF RATIO OF CURRENT TO TOTAL 
THIRD-PARTY LIABILITIES IN A SAMPLE OF 42 




Cía. Colombiana de Tabaco 
Cía. Molinera de Herrán 
Cía. Nacional de Chocolates 
Industrias Alimenticias Noel 





La Garantía-A. Dishington 
Paños Vicuña Santa Fé 
Sociedad Industrial Alicachín 
Tejicondor 
Tejidos Única 




Cementos del Valle 
Cementos Diamante 




Ladrillera La Candelaria 
Tubos Moore 
Vidriera de Colombia 





Industrias Metálicas de Palmira 




Urbanización David Puyana 

























































































































































































































































































































Source: Financial statements of the companies. Office of the Superintendent of Companies. Commerce Section. 
Note: The figures for 1960-1982 were compiled in Figueroa Jaramillo (1983). Those for 1985 were compiled direaly by the authors. 
"The arithmetical average. 
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Table 6 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF LIQUIDITY INDICES IN A SAMPLE 





Cfa. Colombiana de Tabaco 
Cía. Molinera de Herrán 
Cía. Nacional de Chocolates 
Industrias Alimenticias Noel 





La Garantía-A. Dishington 
Paños Vicuña Santa Fé . 
Sociedad Industrial Alicachín 
Tejicondor 
Tejidos Única 




Cementos del Valle 
Cementos Diamante 




Ladrillera La Candelaria 
Tubos Moore 
Vidriera de Colombia 





Industrias Metálicas de Palmira 
Industrias Metalúrgicas Iderna 
Muebles A rtecto 
Avianca 
Cine Colombia 
Urbanización David Puyana 




















































































































































































































































































































4.1 2.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 
Soure*.' Financial statements of the enterprises. Office of the Superintendent of Companies. Commerce Section. 
Note: The figures for 1960-1982 were compiled in Figueroa Jaramillo (1983). Those for 1985 were compiled directly by the authors. 
Current assets 
'Liquidity index = 
Current liabilities 
The arithmetical average. 
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Table 7 
COLOMBIA: AVERAGE COMPOSITION 
OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITIES 
OF A SAMPLE OF ENTERPRISES 





























































Source; For 1971, 1978, 1980 and 1982: Figueroajaramillü 
(1985). 
For 1983, 1984 and 1985: authors' calculations. 
"Includes commercial and non-bank debt. 
2. Distribution of total debt 
In the previous sections an analysis has been 
made of the increase in the total debt of Colom-
bia's business sector; this section will consider 
the holders of this debt, with respect to the 
non-financial sector. 
Table,7 shows the variation between 1971 
and 1985 in the composition of the third-party 
liabilities (debt) of the companies in the sample 
presented in the previous section. Between 1971 
and 1978 the debt owed to the government 
declined from 14.6 to 6.9% of the total debt, 
owing largely to a series of tax amnesties for 
companies which brought their tax returns up to 
date. In contrast, there was an increase in finan-
cial liabilities from 36.1 to 39-4% for reasons 
which are explained in the next section, and 
especially in the personnel liability, which 
increases from 18 to 23-2%; this item consists 
basically of pensions paid by the enterprises and 
the entitlement to retirement pensions3 accumu-
lated by currently employed staff. The other lia-
JThe retirement pension is a benefit established under 
Colombian law equivalent to a monthly payment for each year 
worked, payable on the retirement of the worker; its cumulative 
value is updated on the basis of the last salary received. 
bilities remain relatively stable, as is to be 
expected in view of their predominantly com-
mercial nature (for example, suppliers' credit). 
Between 1978 and 1983 there is a clear trend 
towards higher borrowing from the financial 
sector, which increases from 39.4 to 43.6% of 
the total, while the personnel liability declines 
from 23.2 to 21.3%'* and the official (govern-
ment) liability from 6.9 to 5.3 %; the commercial 
(miscellaneous) liability also declines slightly. 
The 1982-1983 financial crisis is reflected in a 
sharp relative decline in financial debt from 
43.6% in 1983 to 37.3% in 1984, with increases 
in the proportion of personnel and commercial 
liabilities. The financial system had difficulty in 
maintaining the growth rate of new loans to the 
non-financial sector in 1984, especially owing to 
the closure of lines of credit by foreign partners. 
In 1985 there was a return to figures similar 
to those of 1982, with financial liabilities 
amounting to 41.9% of the total. 
3. Financial sector debt 
Major financial reforms were introduced in the 
1970s which led to the establishment of new 
intermediaries (savings and housing institu-
Table 8 
COLOMBIA: RATIO OF M2 TO GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND TO M„ 































Source: M, and M ;: Bank of the Republic. Gross domestic 
product: National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
' M , : Money ¡n circulation plus current accounts. M2: M, 
plus quasi-money (broad money supply). 
4As the Institute of Social Security is beginning to take 
responsibility for an increasing proportion of pensions. 
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tions, commercial finance companies and fidu-
ciary companies) and to an increase in the real 
rates of taxation of financial bodies with the 
removal in 1972-1974 of the legal ceilings which 
kept these rates at negative levels in real terms. 
As a result, quasi-money (savings accounts, 
time deposits) increased swiftly in importance 
(table 8). The trends are clear. Between 1970 
and 1985 money in circulation plus current 
accounts (Mt) declined continuously: it fell from 
86.3 to only 39.8% of the broad money supply 
(M2); this means, among other things, that the 
composition of resources in the financial system 
shifted radically from free resources (current 
accounts do not bear interest in Colombia) to 
interest-bearing resources, thus increasing the 
likelihood of liquidity problems if the portfolio 
declines. 
Table 9 
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Source; (1) Revista del Banco de la República (January 1986), 1970-1985, table 3-1.2. 
(2) Calculations based on data of the Banking Association of Colombia (1985), table 5, p. 22. 
(3) As for (2), but on the basis of data from table 4, p. 20. 
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Similarly, the relative availability of credit in 
the economy increased considerably from an 
M2/GDP ratio of 18.9% in 1970 to 34.1% in 
1985. The financial sector then had to deal with 
three basic factors: a larger relative volume of 
resources to invest, a higher average cost of their 
resources resulting from the increase in the pro-
portion of interest-bearing over current 
accounts, and a sharp rise in the interest rates 
paid and charged. 
The greater availability of domestic resour-
ces also changed the internal and external pro-
portions of the financial sector's debt. The only 
Colombian intermediaries authorized to incur 
debt in foreign currencies are the commercial 
banks and financial corporations (investment 
banks).5 
Since in Colombia the total debt (or third-
party liabilities) of financial intermediaries is 
regulated by law, it ¡s not surprising that the 
ratio of commercial bank debt should have 
shown a slight but sustained increase between 
June 1970 and June 1985 from 86.6 to 92.5% 
(table 9, column (5)). 
The proportion of domestic resources in the 
total bank debt moved cyclically (table 9, column 
(7)), depending on the greater or lesser degree of 
access to external credit determined by the 
government by means of the exchange controls 
which have been in force in Colombia since 1967. 
Between 1975 and 1979 the proportion of 
national resources increased sharply from 60.9 
to 86.4% in step with the expansion of the 
national financial saving described above, which 
resulted from a coffee boom and reduced 
recourse to foreign loans. Between 1979 and 
1983 there was a decline in the relative propor-
tion of domestic resources (to 74.2%) owing to 
greater flexibility on the part of the government 
with respect to external debt. This trend was 
checked by the international crisis of 1982-1983, 
since when the reluctance of foreign banks to 
increase their loans to the third world has held 
the figure at about 75% for the commercial 
banks. 
Table 10 demonstrates in another way the 
increasing dependence of the banking system on 
'Since the distribution of the business debt between obliga-
tions in national and foreign currency shows no permanent 
change, it is concluded that the enterprises resorted increasingly to 
direct borrowing. 
Table 10 
COLOMBIA: RATIO OF INTEREST-
BEARING INTERNAL RESOURCES" 
TO PRODUCTIVE ASSETS OF 
































Source: Carrizosa (1985), pp. 110-111 
"Savings deposits, time certificates of deposit, and 
resources of the Bank of the Republic. 
hLoans, discounts, various debtors and investments. 
interest-bearing domestic resources —with con-
sequences which were to emerge in the crisis of 
the 1980s. 
The performance of financial corporations 
was similar to that of the commercial banks with 
regard to their total level of debt, which 
increased steadily from 77.8% in 1970 to 88.3% 
in 1985 (table 11, column (5)). The composition 
of this debt remained relatively stable up to 
1978: domestic resources accounted for 85.89% 
of it between 1970 and 1978; this proportion 
subsequently declined to 61.5% in 1985- The 
financial corporations were less able to attract 
domestic savings and became increasingly 
dependent on external resources channelled 
through the Bank of the Republic to finance 
imports of capital goods. This dependence was 
to have serious consequences for them with the 
speed-up of the devaluation initiated at the end 
of 1984 as part of the adjustment programme 
agreed with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
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When their borrowing became 100% 
dependent on interest-bearing resources, the 
financial corporations found themselves in the 
same situation as other non-banking interme-
diaries: the savings and housing institutions and 
the commercial finance companies. Accor-
dingly, the crisis in the real-estate sector had a 
serious effect on the liquidity and even the 
solvency of some of them, as will be discussed 
in section III. 
Table 11 
COLOMBIA: FINANCIAL CORPORATION DEBT, 1970-1985 




































































































































































Source: (1) 1970-1977: Manager's report, statistical annex, pp. 80 and 64. 
1978-1985: Revista del Banco de la República. 
(2) 1970-1977: Manager's report, statistical annex. 
1978-1985: Manager's annual reports to the Management Board. 
(3) 1970-1971: Ibid (1). Net worth = paid-up capital + legal reserve + contingency reserves + year's profits. 
1972-1977: Net worth = paid-up capital + legal reserve + contingency reserves. 
1978-1985: Revista del Banco de la República and Manager's reports. 
"The increase is due to the Government's contribution to Financiera Eléctrica Nacional (FEN). 
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II 
Reasons for the internal debt 
It is now necessary to offer an interpretation of 
the debt trends identified in the previous section 
and to examine their effects on the productive 
sector. With this purpose in mind, a presenta-
tion will now be given of the fundamental fac-
tors which determine the choice between debt 
and capitalization and the composition of the 
debt according to its origin (internal or exter-
nal). This model will then be used to analyse the 
possible behaviour of demand and supply of 
domestic credit. At the end of the section an 
account is given of the effects of the increased 
debt on the productive sector and of the role 
played by the higher interest rates at the end of 
the 1970s and the recession in the first half of the 
1980s. 
1. Determination of the structure 
of the financing of capital 
The most widely studied topic in the literature 
on the financial structure of enterprises is the 
distinction between owned capital and debt. The 
essence of this distinction lies in the rights of 
ownership pertaining to each form of financing. 
The value of and return on owned capital 
depends directly on the performance of the 
enterprise. In contrast, the factors which deter-
mine the value of and return on the debt are 
mainly a function of supply and demand in the 
credit market and are relatively independent of 
the performance of the enterprise. The link 
between the financial terms of the debt and the 
debtor enterprise is constituted by a risk pre-
mium covering the likelihood of inability to 
meet third-party obligations. But in any event it 
is significant that the agreed terms of the return 
on and value of the debt capital are relatively 
independent of the results achieved by the enter-
prise, which instead affect the value of dividends 
or the share price. In other words, the interest 
which an enterprise must pay or the debt capital 
which it must repay do not decline if its results 
deteriorate —a factor which imposes inflexibil-
ity in financial management. 
These two main options with respect to the 
structure of a company's assets basically reflect 
the alternative ways in which private individuals 
can finance business capital. This point is illus-
trated in the figure. A personal financial portfo-
lio may consist of shares or bonds. These bonds 
or shares can be issued directly to individuals by 
the enterprises or initially to financial interme-
diaries and institutional investors. Broadly 
speaking, there are four main ways of financing. 
First, individuals may hold shares in corpora-
tions; second, they may hold instruments from 
institutional investors which in turn invest in 
company shares; third, individuals may hold 
company debt; and fourth, they may hold bonds 
and deposits in financial bodies which lend 
directly to enterprises. There are of course other 
means of financing capital which are not shown 
in the figure (for example, institutional inves-
tors can buy bonds instead of shares). But these 
four ways are the most important for the pur-
poses of this study. 
Within debt or business ownership there are 
other distinctions which must be pointed out. 
There are different types of stock (common or 
preference for example) ; different types of stock 
holders (natural persons, private juridical per-
sons, public sector bodies); different types of 
debt (internal or external, long- or short-term); 
and different types of borrower. For the pur-
poses of this study, which is concerned basically 
with domestic business debt, the theoretical 
analysis must be conducted in two stages, exa-
mining first the factors determining the total 
debt of enterprises and then the distribution of 
this debt between foreign and domestic debt. 
a) Issue of shares or contraction of debt 
The traditional approach to the study of the 
structure of the assets of an enterprise, either its 
net worth or its debt, is based on the familiar 
theory of the cost of capital. This theory analyses 
the factors which determine the cost of capital in 
the two financing options, with a view to com-
paring the incentives for choosing one or the 
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Figure 
PRINCIPAL METHODS OF FINANCING CAPITAL 
Lending bodies 
~^> 
Enterprises Private individuals 
Institutional investors 
- © • 
other. The concept of the cost of capital makes it 
possible to determine the cost to an enterprise of 
the resources obtained by borrowing and of 
those obtained by issue of shares. A basic analysis 
indicates that the interest rate is the fundamen-
tal variable, but this answer oversimplifies a 
problem which becomes very complex when the 
effects of taxation, inflation and distribution of 
profits are taken into account. 
The role of these variables can be evaluated 
by means of a simple example which illustrates 
the concept of cost of capital: a businessman has 
to decide whether he should buy machinery to 
increase his production capacity. Assuming that 
there is no inflation or taxes, that our business-
man distributes to himself all the profits, that he 
cannot place shares on the market and that his 
physical assets do not depreciate, it can be con-
cluded that the cost of the capital is simply the 
interest rate in the credit market. This cost indi-
cates the minimum additional amount which the 
new machinery must produce to justify borrow-
ing to expand the operation. If the machinery 
does not produce this minimum, the business-
man would do better to maintain his present 
production level or seek a more profitable line of 
activity. 
When the effects of taxation (personal and 
company) and of inflation are included in the 
analysis, the cost of capital for the issue of share 
(Xa) is calculated as follows: 
xa = 
r - q -I- qc 
_ (D 
where r is the nominal interest rate, q is the 
inflation rate, c is the rate of capital gains tax, 
and 
f = ( l - t ) [ l - ( p u + ( l - p ) c ) ] (2) 
where t is the rate of company tax, q is the rate of 
tax on natural persons, and p is the distributed 
proportion of profits. The cost of capital 
financed by borrowing (Auerbach, 1983, 
pp. 905-940) is: 
X a - - — + q -—•— v> 
1-u 1-u 1-t 
It is to be expected that at the margin the two 
financing alternatives have the same cost. How-
ever, it is not clear which is the variable (or set of 
variables) to be adjusted to equalize these costs 
when the tax levels or inflation rate vary. In the 
model described the possibilities are limited to 
This formula assumes that all interest is deductible but 
dividends (distributed profits) are not. 
PRIVATE INTERNAL DEBT IN COLOMBIA, 1970-1985 / M. Carrhosa and A. Vrdinola 39 
the discount rate or the proportion of distributed 
profits. To give an example, an increase in the 
company tax rate increases Xa and reduces Xj. 
Given a total distribution of profits (i.e., p = 1), 
the effect of an increase in r would be greater on 
Xa than on Xj , so that the equalization of the 
two would require a reduction of r. However, 
there is no need to dwell on this point for the 
purposes of this study. It is sufficient to point 
out, returning to the example, that an increase in 
t will stimulate borrowing and that it is this 
effect which one should seek to corroborate in 
the figures presented in the previous section. 
It is necessary to indicate the expected effects 
of changes in the interest rate, the inflation rate 
and the tax rates. To facilitate the analysis it is 
assumed that companies distribute all their prof-
its and that capital gains due to inflation are not 
taxed. Given these assumptions, an increase in 
the interest rate, with the inflation rate remain-
ing constant, will increase the cost of issuing 
shares more than the cost of borrowing. The 
reason is that part of this increase is deductible as 
a cost in the case of borrowing, but it is not 
deductible when the return on capital is paid as 
dividends. To put it another way, profits are 
taxed twice and interest is taxed only once, so 
that an increase in the real interest rate increases 
the cost of share issues more. 
In contrast, the effect of an increase in infla-
tion, with the real interest rate remaining con-
stant (i.e., r - q), depends on the values of 
company and personal tax rates. If the company 
rate is higher than the personal rate, the cost of 
borrowing goes down. The opposite happens if 
the personal rate is higher than the company 
rate. An increase in the inflation rate, given the 
assumptions described above, has no effect on 
the cost of capital through share issues, since it 
has been assumed that capital gains due to infla-
tion are not in fact taxed. 
An increase in company taxation increases 
the cost of borrowing less as it also generates, in 
this case, a deduction. But the heavier taxation 
increases even further the double taxation of 
profits distributed as dividends. On the other 
hand, an increase in the personal tax rate 
increases the cost of borrowing more, for it taxes 
at the personal level the inflationary movement 
of interest rates. The validity of this last conclu-
sion depends of course on interest actually being 
subject to personal taxation. This assumption is 
debatable in the case of Colombia, where the 
evasion of taxes on interest income seems to be 
greater than in the case of dividend income. 
b) Internal borrowing as against external 
borrowing 
The analysis so far has been concerned with 
the distribution of business liabilities between 
debt and capitalization, with the implicit 
assumption of homogeneous borrowing alterna-
tives. However, one of the main purposes of this 
study is precisely to study the behaviour of 
domestic borrowing. 
In the Colombian economy the distinction 
between domestic and foreign borrowing is vir-
tually the same as that between debt in the 
national currency and debt in foreign currency, 
although there are some lending operations in 
the national currency using external resources, 
when the exchange risk is assumed by the Bank 
of the Republic. 
In a credit market with no artificial or insti-
tutional restrictions on quantities or prices 
(interest rates for example), with absolutely cer-
tain forecasts of exchange rate movements, and 
with equality of tax treatment, businessmen 
would not care whether they borrowed in the 
national currency or in foreign currency, for the 
interest rate in the national currency would be 
equal to the sum of the external interest rate and 
the accurately forecast devaluation. However, if 
the forecast of devaluation is only slightly out, it 
is no longer a matter of indifference whether the 
debt is acquired in one or the other type of 
currency. For an enterprise whose prices are not 
adjusted in step with the exchange rate, the risk 
of losses through external borrowing is greater 
than for an enterprise with an internationally 
marketable product. Furthermore, there may be 
major restrictions on access to the different 
types of credit, and this factor is of greater 
importance in the case of Colombia. At times in 
the past institutional factors have determined 
access to credit in the national currency; at other 
times, the exchange rate policy or the credit 
policy of international lending bodies have 
limited the use of external resources. It is there-
fore necessary to review both the devaluation 
pattern in Colombia and the various policies 
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which have restricted the market in one way or 
the other during the last 20 years. 
Colombia of course has been using the sys-
tem of crawling peg devaluation since 1967. The 
devaluation rate is adjusted according to the 
availability or otherwise of foreign exchange. Up 
to 1975 the devaluation in real terms was fairly 
rapid and designed to increase the supply of 
foreign exchange following its sharp decline in 
the mid-1960s. During the second half of the 
1970s real devaluation was slow (negative, in 
fact), because coffee and other products (includ-
ing narcotics) generated an abundant supply of 
foreign currency. But from 1983 the devaluation 
was rapid as a result of the foreign exchange 
crisis which occurred in that year. The year of 
sharpest devaluation in this latter period was 
1985, with a fall of 50% in the value of the 
Colombian peso without precedent in the 
crawling peg period. This episode had probably 
been anticipated by businesses for some time, 
although there had been doubt as to the precise 
moment when it. would occur. 
With regard to institutional restrictions, 
those of interna] origin are due to the monetary 
policy, usually preoccupied with the possible 
effect on the monetary sector of foreign 
exchange obtained by external borrowing. In the 
second half of the 1970s when it was assumed 
that the slow rate of devaluation would stimulate 
the demand for credit in foreign currency, this 
demand was limited by the restrictions intro-
duced by the Monetary Board. In the 1980s the 
limitations originated instead in the foreign 
lending institutions, which wished to make a 
sizeable reduction in their loan expansion in the 
Latin American area in general. Colombia was 
affected by this change in the perception of the 
risk, although it fared better than some other 
countries of the region. 
Lastly, attention must be drawn to an impor-
tant difference between the tax treatment of the 
cost of external debt and the treatment of the 
cost of internal debt. Up to 1978 the exchange 
rate adjustment of the external debt incurred to 
provide working capital was not accepted as a 
deduction. In contrast, the interest on borrowing 
in the national currency has always been fully 
deductible.. This creates an imbalance in the 
determination of the cost of the debt, depending 
on whether it is in foreign or the national 
currency. 
2. Stimulation of the demand for credit 
Using equations (1) and (3) it is possible to 
calculate the evolution of the theoretical cost in 
Colombia of capital for corporations, depending 
on whether it is financed by borrowing or by 
share issues. This calculation was made inCarri-
zosa ( 1986). His results in the case of total distri-
bution of a corporation's profits are given in 
table 12. This shows that the cost of capital 
obtained by share issues has usually been higher 
than the cost of capital obtained by borrowing. It 
is now necessary to analyse the reasons for this 
constant discrepancy. 
Before 1953 there was no double taxation of 
profits in Colombia. Corporation shareholders 
paid no taxes on the dividends they received, but 
the corporations did pay taxes on their profits at 
progressive rates. Furthermore, limited liability 
companies did not pay taxes, while their share-
holders paid income tax on their holdings in 
these companies. Both companies and natural 
persons were also affected by the tax on excess 
profits and other surtaxes which formed part of 
the taxation of income. Even though there was 
no double taxation before the 1953 reform, the 
cost of borrowing was still lower at that time 
than the cost of share issues. This was due to 
inflation (a phenomenon which increases the 
tax advantage of borrowing when interest pay-
ments are fully deductible) and to the low nomi-
nal interest rates up to 1974. With the 1953 
reform the relative advantage of borrowing 
increased significantly, for this reform, in addi-
tion to introducing double taxation, increased 
the tax rates applicable to corporations more 
than those applicable to natural persons. Double 
taxation reduced the tax advantage of dividends; 
the greater increase in the company rates 
increased the effect on company taxes of the 
deductibility of interest payments. 
From the 1953 tax reform up to the I960 
reform inflation increased the tax rates applica-
ble to each level of the real income of natural 
persons and companies. An increase in the com-
pany tax rate increases the relative advantage of 
borrowing; an increase in the personal rate 
decreases that advantage, for it is applied to the 
totality of interest payments but does not affect 
the portion of profits already taxed in the corpo-
ration. The net effect of these forces reduced the 
relative advantage of borrowing for natural per-
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Table 12 
COLOMBIA: THEORETICAL COST OF CAPITAL FOR A CORPORATION, 












































































































Source: Carrizosa (1986), p. 75. 
"A total distribution of profits is assumed. 
''Constant 1985 pesos. 
eBefore that year's tax reform. 
dAfter that year's tax reform. 
'The percentages in brackets assume a capital gains tax of 20%. 
sons with high incomes, while the effect of infla-
tion on the rates applicable to low incomes was 
insignificant. 
The I960 tax reform lowered the rates appli-
cable to natural persons (except in the case of 
high incomes) and raised those applicable to 
companies, so that the relative advantage of bor-
rowing was again increased. The positive effect 
of cumulative inflation on the real tax rates 
applicable to natural persons reduced this advan-
tage between I960 and 1967, as did the increases 
in these rates announced in 1967. Between 1967 
and 1974 inflation and interest rates increased, 
and cumulative inflation again increased the tax 
rates applicable to each level of the real income 
of natural persons. This latter effect again 
reduced the advantage of borrowing, even 
though the greater increase in inflation as 
opposed to interest rates partially offset the 
effect of heavier personal taxation on the cost of 
borrowing. The 1974 tax reform increased the 
tax rates applicable to medium and high incomes 
and reduced even further the advantage of bor-
rowing, except for low incomes; this effect 
would have been greater if it had not been 
decided at the same time to raise the rates appli-
cable to company profits. Between 1974 and 
1982 the effect of cumulative inflation on per-
sonal tax rates again reduced the tax advantage 
of borrowing, but the increase in interest rates 
had a greater impact on the cost of obtaining 
capital by issuing shares, because the alternative 
of borrowing permitted the deduction of interest 
payments. Accordingly, the net advantage of this 
latter option was maintained. Subsequently, the 
1983 reform eased the burden of double taxation 
on dividends and personal taxation of interest, 
with a net result in favour of borrowing. 
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The figures in table 12 show that the theo-
retical cost of issuing shares has generally 
remained above the theoretical cost of borrow-
ing. In view of the additional fact that personal 
taxation of interest is more easily evaded than 
personal taxation of dividends, the advantage of 
borrowing over share issues is even greater. This 
advantage explains to a great extent why in 
Colombia companies have sought to borrow in 
the form described in the previous section. 
Another less familiar aspect of the problem 
is the role played by borrowing as a means of 
restricting shareholding in companies and iso-
lating them from control by small savers. Use of 
this mechanism is stimulated by increases in tax 
rates, for tax evasion is easier through close 
companies. 
Although information about the distribution 
of the business debt between national and for-
eign currencies is very limited, the figures pres-
ented above in table 3 suggest that this 
distribution has undergone no permanent 
changes. The analysis of the choice between the 
two modes of debt should also take into account 
the changes both in the degree of exchange risk 
and in the access to the two types of resource. 
Moreover, ex post devaluation affects the true 
cost of external debt, an aspect reflected in the 
changes observed in the borrowing pattern. It 
was seen earlier that the relative importance of 
private external borrowing declined between 
1975 and 1978, owing mainly to two factors: 
firstly, the slower rate of devaluation in the 
period reduced the increase in the peso value of 
the existing external debt; secondly, although 
this slower rate of devaluation increased the 
demand for external credit, the financial policy 
limited access to these resources, in order to 
check the accumulation of international 
reserves, a phenomenon which was threatening 
monetary stability. 
It is also of interest to analyse the period 
1982-1985. The available figures indicate that in 
this period the dollar debt stabilized and then 
fell. This was helped both by the greater per-
ceived risk of sudden devaluation and by the 
gradual hardening of attitudes towards Latin 
America in the external credit markets. How-
ever, the peso value of this debt increased more 
quickly than the debt contracted in the national 
currency, owing to the rapid rate of devaluation. 
Little more can be said on the basis of the global 
figures available. It seems clear, however, that 
the distribution of the debt between foreign and 
national currencies is very sensitive to the provi-
sions of financial policy, the effective devalua-
tion rate and the access allowed by external 
lending bodies. Nor is it surprising that, on aver-
age, the relative importance of external resour-
ces has undergone no permanent change. 
3. Institutional aspects of the 
provision of credit by the 
financial sector 
The financial reforms of the first half of the 
1970s increased considerably the volume of 
financial savings and the numbers and types of 
bodies involved in intermediation. There was an 
explosion in financial activity and a proliferation 
of all kinds of enterprise, some regulated by the 
Office of the Superintendent of Banks and others 
under no kind of control seeking to attract per-
sonal savings by offering high real interest rates; 
these bodies, as has been indicated, were no 
novelty in Colombia (Carrízosa, 1985), for even 
before the 1970s there were high real rates in the 
free money market. The novelty lay in permit-
ting (initially the savings and housing institu-
tions in 1972 and thereafter the whole financial 
system) to pay high real positive interest rates 
for financial savings. The result was a dramatic 
increase in the ratio of M2 to GDP, which almost 
doubled during the last 15 years (table 8). 
The great increase in the acquisition of sav-
ings by financial intermediaries had a number of 
important consequences both for share values 
and for the concentration of loans, the prolifera-
tion of intermediaries and the quality of their 
portfolios. 
a) Decline in share values 
Since the country did not have a stock market 
with big institutional investors capable of appre-
ciating the impact of such factors as net worth or 
profitability on the intrinsic value of shares, 
share prices came to depend on the capacity of a 
corporation to pay the small or medium saver a 
dividend competitive with the interest rates 
offered by financial intermediaries. 
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The increases from 1972 in the real interest 
rates offered to the saver by financial bodies had 
a devastating effect on shares: "in 1965 they 
accounted for 59% of the value of transactions 
on the Bogotá Stock Exchange; in 1970 the pro-
portion was still 57%; in 1975, 25%; in 1980, 
14%; and in 1982, 5.5 %" (Figueroa, 1983, p. 6). 
Corporations tried to protect themselves by 
distributing a larger proportion of their net 
profits, from 64.4% in 1970 to 77.3% in 1982 
for the sample studied. "Despite this, and as was 
to be expected, dividends alone could not make 
shares competitive. Therefore, the share price 
index deflated by the index of implicit GDP pri-
ces shows a steady deterioration after the estab-
lishment of double taxation in the 1950s." 
(Figueroa, 1983, p. 6). 
Between 1970 and 1975 the decline in the 
real value of shares worsened to a level between 
23 and 3 3 % lower than the 1970 level, reflecting 
the new interest rates paid from 1972 by the 
system which operated with units of constant 
purchasing power and by the financial system as 
a whole from 1974. 
The real depreciation of share values 
brought their market prices down to a level 
much below their intrinsic value; this attracted 
the interest of business groups which saw a good 
opportunity to acquire the country's big open 
corporations at low cost, taking advantage of the 
fact that the shares of these companies were held 
by a large number of small and medium inves-
tors who were interested only in dividends, 
which were becoming increasingly less competi-
tive with the interest rates offered by the finan-
cial sector. 
From the 1970s Colombia underwent an 
intense process of concentration of the owner-
ship of its main corporations. 
Many of the company acquisitions in this 
period were made by industrial-financial conglo-
merates using resources obtained from the pub-
lic at high real interest rates. It was assumed that 
these acquisitions would provide bigger profits 
than dividends alone by concentrating within 
the group a whole series of sources of profit 
(insurance, deposits, etc.); this situation, 
together with windfall profits from the sale of 
the fixed assets of the acquired enterprises, 
enabled the group to pay the interest to the 
savers and make a good profit in the process. 
Lastly, the small size and the inadequacy of 
the national market in shares meant that real 
share values were weakened by measures such as 
double taxation and the freeing of interest rates, 
which in turn stimulated high-risk speculation 
with the public's savings. 
The government was worried by the impli-
cations of this process and in 1979 it set up the 
National Securities Commission to regulate the 
acquisition of companies in the Stock Market 
and the public offer of securities in general; but it 
was too late, because an enormous volume of 
assets had already been taken over by a few 
conglomerates whose consolidated debt level 
through the process known as "pyramidation" 
was very high. These conglomerates, just like the 
independent companies which entered the 
1980s with high levels of debt, proved to be 
incapable of withstanding the economic slow-
down which began in 1980, as will be seen below. 
b) Concentration of loans 
The abundance of resources and financial 
intermediaries created strong competition in 
lending to clients who could show "in the books" 
sufficient profit margins to be able to pay the 
high interest rates charged by the intermediar-
ies. Many of these intermediaries lacked the 
extensive banking networks needed for the wide 
distribution of their loans among consumers and 
small and medium enterprises or a wide geogra-
phical distribution, and accordingly they concen-
trated their lending on the more dynamic 
enterprises of the non-financial sector. As the 
fixed assets of these enterprises were mortgaged 
to the bodies which had acted as intermediaries 
in their acquisition (banks or corporations), the 
new loans were usually granted them without 
real guarantees, and this was to have a devastat-
ing effect in the future, as will be seen below. 
The problem of excessively high debt levels 
in the balances of productive enterprises was 
solved by ingenious accountants by means of 
"commercial" revaluations of the fixed assets; 
the inclusion of this increased value in the net 
worth secured a considerable reduction in the 
companies apparent debt. This method was also 
used by the financial bodies, as will be seen 
below, and its dangers came to light when later 
many of these assets had to be accepted instead 
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of payment, revealing the unreality of many 
"commercial" valuations. 
What was even more serious, the competi-
tion among intermediaries in the swift and 
wholesale investment of their abundant and 
costly resources caused them to accept as stand-
ard practice the constant refinancing of short-
term loans, so that loan applications were 
considered only on the basis of the clients' capac-
ity to pay the interest but not to repay the capital. 
When the economy slowed down at the end of 
the 1979 coffee cycle and the banks began to find 
that their clients were having difficulty in paying 
the interest on time, they realized with alarm 
that it would be even less possible for them to 
repay the principal and that the high level of 
debt meant that the owners of the debtor enter-
prises were not interested in saving them with 
injections of capital. In other words, by concen-
trating its lending on a relatively small number 
of enterprises, the financial sector would end up 
as their owner when the cyclical decline of coffee 
affected the profit levels of the non-financial 
sector in the 1980s. 
c) Proliferation of intermediaries and taxation 
difficulties 
The proliferation of intermediaries and 
their offices made it impossible for the Office of 
the Superintendent of Banks to exercise effective 
control over their activities. This body had been 
set up in 1923 in order to carry out extensive, 
detailed and frequent audits of a fairly small 
number (20) of banks and insurance companies. 
With the passage of the years it acquired all 
kinds of supervisory functions for such dissimi-
lar bodies as urban development corporations 
and stockbrokers. 
In the mid-1970s the Office was supervising 
more than 300 bodies with 2 500 offices. How-
ever, its machinery for visits, analysis and con-
trol remained the same as in 1930, despite the 
increasing systematization of financial bodies. 
Accordingly, the Office could neither detect nor 
prevent the abuses, self-loans and theft which 
some unscrupulous businessmen committed 
with the public's savings, not to mention those 
which occurred in enterprises not supervised by 
the Office which also sought to attract public 
savings on a massive scale and quite irresponsi-
bly at very high real interest rates (20% and 
above). This led the government in 1982 to 
decree it a crime for bodies to acquire the public's 
savings on a massive and regular basis unless 
specifically authorized to do so, but it was too 
late. 
Over the years the Office has had to inter-
vene in and administer the bankruptcy of 32 
financial bodies, and it was not equipped for this 
task either. The government has now instituted 
a thorough reform of the Office, including a 
reduction of the number of bodies supervised 
and of reports required, total systematization of 
data handling, and an improved programme of 
training and remuneration for the staff, now 
mostly young and with a high turnover rate. 
There is no doubt that many of the problems of 
the financial sector (such as laxity in granting 
loans, illegal self-loans, theft, etc.) could have 
been avoided if the Office of the Superintendent 
of Banks had been modernized ten years earlier. 
d) Inadequacy of accounting regulations 
Just as there was no proper machinery for 
control of financial bodies, so the country had no 
clear and comprehensive regulations governing 
the accounting of enterprises in the productive 
sector; there were big gaps in the interpretation 
of the accounting regulations in critical areas 
(such as the treatment of the effects of inflation 
on balances and profit and loss statements, pres-
entation of suspense accounts, etc.) which gave 
accountants and auditors a wide margin of dis-
cretion; this prompted unscrupulous business-
men to use accountants and auditors who were 
"broad-minded", when not frankly dishonest. 
This is what creditors found when they came to 
check the truth of the financial statements of 
their defaulting debtors, and many prosecutions 
resulted. 
The administrative inadequacy of the Office 
of the Superintendent of Companies, responsi-
ble for supervision and control of corporations 
and the larger limited companies was, in con-
junction with the ineffective accounting rules, 
another critical factor in the errors committed by 
the banks when they made loans on the basis of 
these massaged financial statements. As in the 
case of the Office of the Superintendent of 
Banks, the Office of the Superintendent of Com-
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Table 13 
COLOMBIA: DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT INCOME, REAL 
INTEREST RATES, AND DEVIATION OF GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT WITH RESPECT TO THE TREND 









































































Source: ( 1) DANE, National Accounts of Colombia: income and expenditure accounts of private non-financial enterprises. 
(2) Carrizosa (1985), p. 96. 
(3) Logarithmic regression of the gross domestic product in terms of population. 
panies did not have the technology nor did it give 
its poorly paid staff sufficient training to cope 
with the enormous increase in the number and 
complexity of the enterprises under its supervi-
sion; this does much to explain investors' mis-
trust of the statements of net worth made by 
companies and of the reliability of valuations as a 
factor in determining share values in addition to 
distributed dividends. 
In 1986 the government issued Decree 2160 
on accounting regulations, with a view to cor-
recting the most obvious shortcomings in this 
area, although this did not provide any basic 
solutions to the thorny problem of the account-
ing of inflation. 
4. Effects on the productive sector 
One of the interesting problems caused by the 
increase in borrowing discussed here relates to 
its effects on the performance of the productive 
sector. The point which has to be examined, 
therefore, is the effect of debt on the likelihood 
of the enterprises becoming bankrupt. A high 
level of debt increases the risk of bankruptcy as a 
result of recession or higher interest rates. It 
must be assumed that the high bankruptcy rate is 
inversely related to the proportion of profits in 
total investment income for the economy as a 
whole. The lower this proportion, the higher the 
probable number of bankruptcies. 
The value of this proportion from 1970 to 
1983 is given in table 13, column (1). Column 
(2) of the table gives estimates of the real inter-
est rate. Column (3) indicates the percentage 
difference between the value of the GDP and the 
long-term GDP trend associated with population 
increase. In the period under study there were 
two stages of vigorous economic growth (1970-
1974 and 1976-1980), one short recession in 
1975 and another long one from 1980 onwards. 
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It is interesting to analyse this latter recession. 
The figures in the first column of the table show 
both the high level of debt and the effect of the 
economic recession and the high interest rates 
on profits since 1980. For many enterprises the 
recession meant losses which prevented them 
from meeting their obligations to the financial 
system. The coincidence of sharp recession, high 
real interest rates and high levels of debt pro-
duced a situation in which part of the productive 
sector could not remain solvent and transferred 
its losses to the lending bodies, making them pay 
for the risk they had incurred by lending without 
due caution, with the support by omission of an 
Office of the Superintendent of Banks which was 
incapable of evaluating the ratio of capital to risk 
assets in these lending bodies. 
By contrast, the relatively low debt indices of 
earlier decades enabled enterprises to absorb the 
blows of recession with less financial damage. 
The Colombian economy had undergone pro-
found recessions in the past (in 1967, for exam-
ple), but it had never before experienced such 
widespread bankruptcy. Not since 1950 had the 
1. Evolution of the portfolios 
of finance bodies 
In earlier sections we saw how the joint effect of 
an unlimited demand for credit on the part of the 
non-financial sector and a great increase in the 
resources available in the financial sector owing 
to the 1972-1974 reforms pushed the borrowing 
of the country's main non-financial enterprises 
to very high levels at the beginning of the 1980s. 
We also saw that the profit margins of com-
panies in the productive sector began to fall as a 
result of the slower growth rate, so that these 
companies could not continue to pay the high 
real interest rates prevailing in the country. The 
over-borrowed enterprises then began to fall 
behind in their interest payments and this prob-
lem was initially solved by the finance bodies 
banks had such high indices for their matured or 
doubtful debt portfolios. This point will be con-
sidered in the next section. 
From another standpoint, it must be won-
dered whether the phenomenon of bankruptcy 
has a feedback effect on the productive sector. 
An enterprise which cannot pay its obligations 
to the banks and goes bankrupt ceases to pro-
duce; although its operations may continue to be 
profitable, the enterprise is not institutionally 
viable, owing to the conflict of entitlement 
which the bankruptcy proceedings have to settle. 
The result can be different in a well-capitalized 
enterprise since the losses are absorbed by the 
shareholders, for whom the loss on the share's 
value may be temporary in the case of an enter-
prise viable in the long term. It is very difficult to 
determine how many bankrupt enterprises in 
Colombia could have continued to operate if they 
had a solider capital base instead of being con-
verted into scrap or distrained and mortgaged 
goods awaiting the unfolding of the whole 
gamut of legal and institutional procedures 
involved in bankruptcy. 
through the continual refinancing of principal 
and interest, increasing even further the debt 
levels of their clients. This was due to the need 
not to leave the portfolio hanging due, for other-
wise these items would have to be included 
among the doubtful debts. Under Colombian 
law, debts not backed by real guarantees have to 
be covered by portfolio-protection arrange-
ments equivalent to 100% of the value of the 
debts plus the interest due but not paid, and the 
same must be done for that part of the doubtful 
debts which is not fully backed by real guarantees 
(mortgages, liens, etc.). 
It was explained earlier that the finance 
bodies had granted loans to many over-borrowed 
enterprises without real guarantees, for these 
enterprises were usually mortgaged to the credi-
tors who had financed the construction or 
III 
Role of company debt in the difficulties of 
the financial sector during the 1980s 
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Table U 
COLOMBIA: PROPORTION OF MATURED AND DOUBTFUL 






































































































































































































































Source: Revista del Banco de la República (January 1986). 
"Refers to the banking system, excluding the Caja Agraria and the Banco Central Hipotecario (BCH). 
''Refers to loans due as a proportion of total loans and discounts of savings and housing institutions. 
import of the fixed assets. Thus the first reaction 
to the crisis by the financial sector was to close 
the eyes and refinance, in the hope of an eco-
nomic recovery. When this did not occur, 
harassed businessmen continued to request 
more loans to pay their interest, not to mention 
the permanent refinancing of the principal. 
Finally, the banks had to settle the problem 
once and for all by leaving the obligations due, in 
order to force the businessmen to seek alterna-
tive means of recapitalization by punishing 
them with penalty payments and threats of 
distraint. 
Table 14 shows that in June 1980 the 
matured portfolio of the commercial banks 
exceeded for the first time the limit of 7%, 
without this being reflected at first among the 
doubtful debts. But given the economic situation, 
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this alarm signal was not enough, and the banks' 
matured portfolio continued to increase from 
that year until 1983; at this level the problem 
had already become one of accumulated bad 
debts, as can be seen from their rapid increase 
from_1982 to a peak of 18.7% in June 1985. 
The main reason why the problems were 
shifted to the area of bad debt and therefore to 
the profit and loss statements of the financial 
sector in accordance with the mandatory regula-
tions governing such cases was the sudden pro-
liferation of concordats in the productive sector. 
When the banks brought pressure to bear on 
overextended businessmen by refusing to refi-
nance the interest payments or the principal, the 
businessmen refused to capitalize their compan-
ies owing to the enormous burden of the debt 
and the uncertainties about the economy's devel-
opment, and they preferred to use the formula of 
preventative concordat to protect themselves 
against the finance bodies and other creditors. 
Colombian law provides that once an enter-
prise requests a preventative concordat with its 
creditors, the creditors cannot distrain upon it or 
call in their real guarantees until a decision about 
the future of the enterprise has been taken by a 
majority representing not less than 70% of the 
value of the amount owed. This amount must 
first be accepted by the enterprise or, in the 
event of a dispute, determined by a judge. 
Throughout this process the owners retain 
control and management of the enterprise. In 
many cases they themselves complicate the pro-
ceedings (by contesting the validity of debts, for 
example), so that years can pass without a meet-
ing of creditors capable of taking decisions about 
the enterprise's future: to liquidate or administer 
directly. 
In some cases the time gained by the busi-
nessmen is used to strip the enterprise from 
within, leaving the creditors with a shell full of 
liabilities. 
The widespread use of the concordat has had 
enormous effects on the financial sector, for 
according to the rules of the Office of the Super-
intendent of Banks, once an enterprise requests a 
concordat, the debts, due or not, are included 
among the bad debts, with the additional prob-
lem that even in the case of obligations backed by 
real guarantees cover must be provided for 50% 
of the value of the interest due but not paid. 
Accordingly, from 1983 the banks' bad debts 
have increased more quickly than their matured 
portfolio. 
Finance corporations were affected in the 
same way as the banks from 1979 when their 
matured portfolio began to increase until it 
reached a peak of 10% of the total in December 
1983, then declining once more (table 14). As in 
the case of the banks, the bad debts exceeded the 
7% limit for the first time in December 1982, 
when the Office of the Superintendent of Banks 
began to demand greater strictness in the treat-
ment of the matured portfolio. After stabilizing 
for a while at 14% the corporations' bad debts 
increased to 21.4% owing to a large number of 
new concordats which, as was explained above, 
fall directly under this heading even when the 
obligations are not due. 
The savings and housing institutions, thanks 
to their special regulations which permit them 
to give only first-class mortgages, did not have 
the problems of the other financial intermediar-
ies, as can be seen from table 14. Their bad debts 
did not begin to have an effect until 1984 when 
the recessionary adjustment policies reduced the 
ability of wage-earners to service their housing 
loans, a problem which has grown worse since 
that time. 
The commercial finance companies, which 
in many cases had concentrated their lending in 
the same way as the banks (usually without real 
guarantees in view of the generally short terms 
of their loans), experienced problems very sim-
ilar to those of the commercial banks, as can be 
seen from the sharp increase in their bad debts 
from December 1982. Their difficulties were 
greater because, unlike the other financial inter-
mediaries, they lacked direct sources of liquidity 
in the Bank of the Republic, so that problems of 
this kind tended to become crises of solvency 
which led to official intervention and 
bankruptcy. 
2. Evolution of the profitability 
of finance bodies 
The accounting problems described above con-
cerning the treatment of the effects of inflation 
on fixed assets mean that the concept of the net 
worth of Colombian companies is an unreliable 
basis for calculating their profitability; accord-
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ingly, we have preferred to work with the con-
cept of gross financial margin as a proportion of 
productive assets, which excludes from the 
denominator all kinds of unproductive assets, 
such as deferred accounts receivable and invest-
ments in fixed assets. This relationship is out-
lined in order to show how the deterioration in 
the portfolio of finance bodies, which compelled 
them to provide cover for the interest and prin-
cipal of their bad debts, was increasingly threat-
ening their profitability. In the case of the 
commercial banks, the gross profit margin of the 
investments began to decline from a very high 
level of 8.2% in 1980 to 3% in 1985 (table 15). 
The finance corporations, with more real 
guarantees in their whole portfolio for the full 
period of the terms for which they lent a large 
part of their resources, did not find their profita-
bility affected until a later stage, but the flood of 
bankruptcies and concordats from 1983 onwards 
Table 15 
COLOMBIA: RATIO OF THE GROSS 
FINANCIAL MARGIN OF BANKS 

























































Source: Banking Association of Colombia (1985), pp. 26 
and 44. 
"June of each year. 
finally had an even more dramatic impact on 
them: in 1984 the profit margin was 1.8%, but 
by 1985 it had turned negative at -1.2%. Their 
greater relative borrowing in foreign currency 
became a serious problem when the real devalua-
tion rate increased from 1984. 
The fall in financial profit margins was no 
more than a reflection in the books —in the 
profit and loss statements— of the portfolio 
crisis caused by the inability of the productive 
sector to pay its debts, as was explained earlier; 
the result was the eventual illiquidity of many 
finance bodies, complicated by panic on the part 
of savers when they learned of the bad practices 
or various kinds of illegal lending in some of the 
bodies; from 1982 this led to widespread inter-
vention by the government and the establish-
ment of a special legal regime permitting the 
immediate nationalization of a finance body 
with the reduction almost to zero of the value of 
the contributions of the previous owners. By this 
procedure the government acquired control of 
the finance bodies of the Grupo Grancolom-
biano, the biggest group in the country, and of a 
series of banks, finance corporations, etc., as a 
result of which the State now controls more than 
70% of banking assets. 
The difficulties of other banks compelled the 
government to set up capitalization funds in the 
Bank of the Republic, through which a large 
amount of money has been issued to subsidize 
the capitalization of the financial sector; but this 
has complicated the management of the means 
of payment, with harmful effects on an already 
very unequal distribution of income. 
It must be added that although the nationali-
zations and the acquisition by the State of fidu-
ciary control over a number of large finance 
bodies saved them from bankruptcy and thou-
sands of savers from losing their deposits owing 
to the lack of assets to cover liabilities, the cost to 
the nation has been high. In other cases the 
Office of the Superintendent of Banks simply 
ordered the liquidation of the insolvent finance 
bodies, as was explained above; but as it was not 
capable of managing the 32 bodies which it had 
to administer, the Office had serious difficulties 
in exercising effective control over its own liq-
uidators and in providing due protection for the 
savers. It must be pointed out that there is no 
deposit insurance in Colombia and that when a 
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financial body finds itself in difficulties, the only 
alternatives are State control or ownership. In 
1985 the National Finance Institution Guaran-
tee Fund came into being with the object of 
solving the liquidity problems of such bodies 
before their liquidation or nationalization 
becomes inevitable; in view of the sector's criti-
cal situation, it has been necessary in practice to 
continue the process of State financial control by 
means of numerous inputs of capital from the 
Fund, resources of the Bank of the Republic and 
the savings of the National Coffee Fund. 
Although the National Finance Institution 
Guarantee Fund has powers to create a system of 
deposit guarantees, it has not yet done so, owing 
to the magnitude of the problems and the uncer-
tainty about the real situation of many 
intermediaries. 
3. De capitalization and concentration 
From the accounting standpoint, the losses of 
the finance bodies must be set against their paid-
up capital and reserves. The sharp variation in 
the structure of the net worth of the country's 
banks is therefore no surprise (table 16). In 1970 
the paid-up capital represented 57.7% of the 
banks' net worth, the legal reserve 33%, the 
contingency reserves 3 % , the book valuation 
6 .1%, and the exchange rate adjustment 0.02%. 
In other words, about 94% of the banks' net 
worth in 1970 consisted of cash inputs or 
retained profits, while only 6% was provided by 
the book valuation of fixed assets or foreign 
currency. 
By 1985 the proportions had altered radi-
cally as a result of the decline in the profitability 
of shares; in 1978 the government authorized 
the inclusion of the book valuation of assets to be 
included in the net worth in order to comply 
with the borrowing regulations, with the result 
that the accounting phenomenon already des-
cribed for the productive sector was repeated in 
the financial sector. Shareholders naturally tried 
to make use of this mechanism before putting in 
new money, which from 1972 was more profita-
bly invested in fixed-income bonds, as was 
pointed out above. Accordingly, in 1985 paid-up 
Table 16 
COLOMBIA: NET WORTH OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, 1970-1985 
(Millions of constant 1970 pesos) 




























































































































Source: Banks' balances and calculations of the Banking Association. The figures have been deflated by the wholesale price 
index. 
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Table 17 
COLOMBIA: GINI COEFFICIENTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION 
















































































Source: Bogotá Stock Exchange (1984), Manual del Mercado Bursátil, Bogotá. 
capital and reserves constituted less than40% of 
the banks' net worth, while 61 % was provided 
by book valuations of very dubious real 
significance. 
What is striking is that even though these 
accounting mechanisms were used, the losses 
reduced the real value of the banks' net worth 
from a maximum of 4 706 million 1970 pesos in 
1983 to 3 864 million in 1985. Even in the peak 
year of 1983 the increase over 1970 was only 
46% (2.95% a year compounded) in real terms, 
over a period of 13 years in which M2 increased 
at a dizzying speed in comparison with the gross 
domestic product. 
In addition to the real decapitalization of the 
banks from 1983, this period also saw the culmi-
nation of a process of concentration of share-
holding which, as we said, developed in all the 
country's big corporations in the 1970s. 
A sample of four big private banks and two 
insurance companies (table 17) shows that in all 
of them the index of shareholding concentration 
increased between 1974 and 1983; in all except 
one of the banks the number of shareholders 
declined, for shareholding became concentrated 
in companies which bought the holdings of indi-
vidual shareholders who then invested the pro-
ceeds in fixed-income bonds. This process was 
followed by the operation of the companies 
through the mechanism of the group or conglo-
merate, with the resulting concentration of loans 
and profits. 
The previous government made efforts to 
democratize the finance bodies by means of 
decrees establishing mandatory time-limits for 
this; these deadlines have had to be extended 
time and again owing to the sector's poor returns 
and the public's lack of confidence in it; 
moreover, the subsidized loans from the capitali-
zation funds established to bring new investors 
into the financial and productive sectors have 
only accentuated the process of concentration, 
for in practice the issues of shares and of bonds 
convertible into shares have been taken up only 
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by the same shareholders who control the issu-
ing company. 
The goal of the previous and the present 
government of capitalizing the productive and 
financial sectors, making them more democratic 
along the way, has not only not been achieved, it 
is actually impossible before the solution of the 
major structural problems noted in earlier chap-
This article has demonstrated clearly the trend 
towards greater indebtedness in Colombia's bus-
iness, financial and non-financial sectors from 
1950 to 1985. This debt was distributed in rela-
tively constant proportions between internal 
and external debt throughout the period from 
1970, during which the present exchange control 
regulations have been in force. The short-term 
debt also remained relatively stable as a propor-
tion of the total debt of non-financial enter-
prises, according to a sample analysed in detail. 
During the period under study enterprises 
increased their debts to the financial sector and 
the labour sector, although this latter debt has 
remained relatively stable since the mid-1970s. 
The reason for the increasing debt of the produc-
tive sector lay therefore in the financial field. 
To explain this phenomenon use was made 
of a theoretical model of the cost of capital which 
links the tax, interest and inflation factors and 
indicates that the demand for credit on the part 
of corporations has been strongly stimulated, at 
least since 1950, by tax and inflation factors. In 
particular, the taxation of company income, 
inflation and the easier opportunities to evade 
personal taxes on interest have all encouraged 
borrowing. 
The supply of capital was directed basically 
into shares up to the end of the 1960s, owing to 
the freezing at negative real levels of the interest 
rates which the financial intermediaries could 
offer. The reforms of the 1970s changed this 
situation and rapidly increased the supply of 
credit based on quasi-money acquired at high 
real rates by the finance bodies. 
ters with respect to the development of the 
national capital market; nor is any improvement 
possible in the current low profitability of the 
majority of corporations in comparison to the 
rates of interest paid to the saver; nor is it possi-
ble to overcome the savers' lack of confidence in 
the moral qualities of many of the administra-
tors and businessmen. 
Investment costs and concentration in con-
glomerates produced an accumulation of loans 
which facilitated dangerous levels of debt in the 
country's main companies, which believed that 
their gross profits were sufficient to cover the 
financial costs and that the supply of credit 
would permit the permanent renewal of the 
loans. 
The decline in the growth rate of the Colom-
bian economy from 1980 surprised a large part 
of the productive sector with high financial costs 
which were increasingly difficult to meet; then 
followed the payment delays and defaults which 
finally led to concordats and to bad debts in the 
finance bodies. This in turn caused substantial 
losses as a result of application of the regulations 
concerning bad-debt provision in financial inter-
mediaries, which led to the official control of 
banks and corporations and finally to their 
nationalization in some important cases. 
A number of significant conclusions can be 
drawn from this summary: 
a) If the company tax regulations allow the 
deduction of interest paid but not dividends dis-
tributed, there is an incentive to borrow as a 
means of obtaining capital. This incentive will 
be greatest when the nominal interest rates are 
highest and when it is easiest to evade personal 
taxation of interest income. 
b) However, if enterprises in the productive 
sector are actually to incur increased debt, the 
financial intermediaries must have sufficient 
resources and the will to assume the risks of this 
debt. The first condition is met in imperfect 
IV 
Summary and conclusions 
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capital markets in which the increase in share 
values is not perceived by investors as part of the 
return and which instead allow intermediaries to 
offer high interest rates to attract savings. 
The willingness to run the risks depends on 
the degree of concentration of the enterprises in 
industrial-financial conglomerates, on the dis-
persal and size of the intermediaries, on their 
professionalism, on the control effectively exer-
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